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Can war and war-making be seen as a
special case of a general theory of social
conflict? General theories of social conflict
attempt to encompass forms as diverse as
family, community, ethnic, and class conflict
(1, 3, 10). Clearly, the understanding of
war would be a crucial test of any general
theory of social conflict.’ Despite aspirations
for generalized explanations of social con-
flicts, social scientists cannot overlook the
highly distinctive aspects of war as a proc-
ess of social change.
First, as of the second half of the twen-
tieth century, wars are &dquo;unique&dquo; forms of
social conflicts because they are waged only
by nation-states. War implies social conflict
between nation-states with their ideologies
for legitimizing the use of violence in the
national interest. The nation-state is a terri-
torially based social system which monop-
olizes the use of the instruments of violence
for both internal and external objectives.
This is not to exclude from consideration
armed conflict between established &dquo;impe-
rial&dquo; nation-states and revolutionary political
groups seeking to establish new and inde-
pendent nation-states. In the last two dec-
ades important political movements of na-
tional independence have been able to arm
themselves. In the process of expelling im-
perial powers, these revolutionary political
movements only create new nation-states
which become potential and actual war-
makers.
Second, war is differentiated from other
forms of social conflict because war-making
relies on a highly professionalized and spe-
cialized occupation, the professional soldier.
By contrast, for example, conflict in the
family, in community affairs, and even in
wide aspects of economic relations involves
no or little specialization of personnel. In
these arenas the personnel are the same in
conflict and in non-conflict situations. Nev-
ertheless, in most nation-states-totalitarian
and democratic - the decision to threaten
war or to make war involves &dquo;politicians&dquo;
and &dquo;civilian&dquo; leaders with broad manip-
ulative skills and not primarily the military
professionals. Regardless of the political
power of the military elite, the classical
forms of absolute military dictatorship are
not applicable to a modem mass-industrial-
ized social structure.
Third, the transition from peace to war
and from war to peace is determined by a
calculus which cannot be found in other
types of social conflict. The essential calcu-
lus of war-making does not rest on the pos-
tulate that any prolongation of peace will
increase the probabilities for the further
1 See Wright (13), esp. chap. xvi, "Scientific
Method and the Study of War."
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prolongation of peace. On the contrary, giv-
en the dynamics of the traditional arms
race, the prolongation of peace brings with
it increased uncertainty about the enemy’s
war-making potential and therefore may in-
crease the probability of war in order to
maintain existing advantages (6). In other
forms of social conflict, social inertia and
the postponement of decisions may contrib-
ute to the non-violent resolution of conflict
and differences.
In the language of social science, simple
equilibrium models are difficult to apply to
the process of war-making.2 Instead, a proc-
ess or developmental analysis which high-
lights the voluntaristic efforts and calcula-
tions of the elites within each nation-state
is more appropriate. These considerations
lead to the analysis of the organization of
political and military elites as a crucial
mechanism in the analysis of war and war-
making.
Is it possible to identify different models
of political-military elite organization-mod-
els which are reflective of different social
structures? Can the consequences of the vast
technological developments in war-making
on the organization of elites be traced out,
in order to infer emerging trends? Can im-
portant uniformities in the motivational and
ideological components of differing political
and military elites be established?
Models of Political-Military Elites
Four models of political-military elites
can be identified-aristocratic, democratic,
totalitarian, and garrison state. For a base
line, it seems appropriate to speak of the
aristocratic model of political-military elite
structure. The aristocratic model is a com-
posite estimate of western European powers
before industrialism began to have its full
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impact (12). In the aristocratic model, civil-
ian and military elites are socially and func-
tionally integrated. The narrow base of re-
cruitment for both elites and a relatively
monolithic power structure provide the civil-
ian elite with a method of &dquo;subjective con-
trol&dquo; of the military (4).
There is a rigorous hierarchy in the aris-
tocratic model which delineates both the
source of authority and the prestige of any
member of the military elite. The low spe-
cialization of the military profession makes
it possible for the political elite to supply
the bulk of the necessary leadership for the
military establishment. The classical pattern
is the aristocratic family which supplies one
son to politics and one to the military. Birth,
family connections, and common ideology
insure that the military will embody the
ideology of the dominant groups in society.
Political control is civilian control only be-
cause there is an identity of interest between
aristocratic and military groups. The mili-
tary is responsible because it is a part of
the government. The officer fights because
he feels that he is issuing the orders.
In contrast to the aristocratic model stands
the democratic one. Under the democratic
model the civilian and military elites are
sharply differentiated. The civilian political
elites exercise control over the military
through a formal set of rules. These rules
specify the functions of the military and the
conditions under which the military may
exercise its power. The military are profes-
sionals in the employ of the state. They are
a small group, and their careers are distinct
from the civilian careers. In fact, being a
professional soldier is incompatible with any
other significant social or political role. The
military leaders obey the government not
because they believe in the goals of the war
but because it is their duty and their profes-
sion to fight. Professional ethics as well as
democratic parliamentary institutions guar-
2 For a discussion of equilibrium models and
social change see Moore (9).
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antee civilian political supremacy. The offi-
cer fights because of his career commitment.
The democratic model is not a historical
reality but rather an objective of political
policy. Elements of the democratic model
have been achieved only in certain Western
industrialized countries, since it requires ex-
tremely viable parliamentary institutions and
broad social consensus about the ends of
government. The democratic model as-
sumes that military leaders can be effective-
ly motivated by professional ethics alone,
and this is most difficult. Paradoxically
enough, certain types of officers with aristo-
cratic background have made important
contributions to the development of the
democratic model.
In the absence of a development toward
the democratic model, the totalitarian mod-
el tends to replace the aristocratic one (11).
The totalitarian model, as it developed in
Germany, in Russia, and to a lesser degree in
Italy, rests on a form of subjective control,
as did the older aristocratic model. But the
subjective control of the totalitarian model
arises not from any natural or social unity
of the political and military elites. On the
contrary, a revolutionary political elite of
relatively low social status and based on a
mass authoritarian political party fashions a
new type of control of the military elite.
The revolutionary elite, bedecked with para-
military symbols and yet forced into tem-
porary alliance with older military profes-
sionals, is dedicated to reconstituting the
military elites. Subjective control of the to-
talitarian variety is enforced by the secret
police, by infiltrating party members into
the military hierarchy, by arming its own
military units, and by controlling the system
of officer selection. Under subjective control
of the totalitarian variety the organizational
independence of the professional military is
destroyed. The officer fights because he has
no altemative.3
The garrison-state model, as offered by
Professor Harold D. Lasswell, is the weak-
ening of civil supremacy which can arise
even out of an effective democratic structure
(7). While the end result of the garrison
state approximates aspects of the totalitarian
model, the garrison state has a different nat-
ural history. It is, however, not the direct
domination of politics by the military. Since
modem industrial nations cannot be ruled
merely by the political domination of a
single small leadership bloc, the garrison
state is not a throwback to a military dic-
tatorship. It is the end result of the ascent
to power of the military elite under condi-
tions of prolonged international tension. In-
ternal freedom is hampered, and the prep-
aration for war becomes overriding. The
garrison state is a new pattern of coalition
in which military groups directly and in-
directly wield unprecedented amounts of
political and administrative power. The mil-
itary retain their organizational independ-
ence, provided that they make appropriate
alliances with civil political factions. The
officer fights for national survival and glory.
It cannot be assumed that all forms of
militarism involve &dquo;designed militarism.&dquo;
&dquo;Designed militarism&dquo;-the type identified
with Prussian militarism-involves the mod-
ification and destruction of civilian institu-
tions by military leaders acting directly and
premeditatedly through the state and other
institutions. Equally significant and more
likely to account for crucial aspects of the
garrison state, as well as for contemporary
American problems, is &dquo;unanticipated mili-
3 The totalitarian model which developed in
western Europe is not the same as the survival
of feudal-like military dictatorship still found in
parts of South America, in which a military junta
directly dominates civilian military life. The
Per&oacute;n model was a strange combination of the
old-style military dictatorship plus the newer de-
vices of the totalitarian model.
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tarism.&dquo; &dquo;Unanticipated militarism&dquo; devel-
ops from a lack of effective traditions and
practices for controlling the military estab-
lishment, as well as from a failure of civilian
political leaders to act relevantly and con-
sistently. Under such circumstances a vacu-
um is created which not only encourages an
extension of the tasks and power of military
leaderships but actually forces such trends.
The threats to the democratic model can-
not be meaningfully analyzed merely from
the point of view of &dquo;designed militarism.&dquo;
&dquo;Designed militarism&dquo; emphasizes the im-
pact of military leadership on the civil social
structure. &dquo;Unanticipated militarism&dquo; re-
quires an analysis of the manner in which
the military profession responds and reacts
to the developments in civilian society. The
technology of war, which is the advanced
technology of civilian society, lies at the




The long-term technological development
of war and war-making required the profes-
sionalization of the militarv elite. Such tech-
nological developments were compatible
with the democratic model of political-mili-
tary elites, since this model rests on the dif-
ferentiation of the functions of politicians
and soldiers. However, the current contin-
uous advance in the technology of war be-
gins to weaken the possibility of the demo-
cratic elite model.
The vast proliferation of the military
establishments of the major industrialized
nations is a direct consequence of the con-
tinuous development of the technology of
warfare. The &dquo;permanent&dquo; character of these
vast military establishments is linked to the
&dquo;permanent&dquo; threat of war. It is well recog-
nized that under these conditions the tasks
which military leaders perform tend to
widen. Their technological knowledge, their
direct and indirect power, and their height-
ened prestige result in their entrance, of ne-
cessity, into arenas which have in the recent
past been preserved for civilian and profes-
sional politicians. The result is the tremen-
dous stress on the traditional assumptions
about the effectiveness of the democratic
model for regulating political-military rela-
tions. The need that political leaders have
for active advice from professional soldiers
about the strategic implications of techno-
logical change serves only to complicate the
task of redefining spheres of competence and
responsibility. Totalitarian, as well as demo-
cratic, nations are faced with these prob-
lems.
The impact of the technological develop-
ment of warfare over the last half-century
leads to a series of propositions about social
change:
A larger percentage of the national in-
come of modem states is spent for the prep-
aration, executing, and repair of the conse-
quences of war.
There is more nearly total popular in-
volvement in the consequences of war and
war policy, since the military establishment
is responsible for the distribution of a larger
share of civilian values and since the de-
structiveness of war has increased asymp-
totically.
The monopolization of legal armed vio-
lence held by the military has increased so
greatly that the task of suppressing internal
violence has declined, as compared with the
external tasks of the national security (2).
The rate of technological change has be-
come accelerated, and a wider diversity of
skill is required to maintain the military
establishment.
The previous periodic character of the
military establishment (rapid expansion,
rapid dismantlement) has given way to a
more permanent maintenance or expansion.
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The pemaneiit charactcr of the military
establishment has removed one important
source of political-military conflict, i.e., the
civilian tendency to abandon the military
establishment after a war. Instead, because
of the high rate of technological change, in-
ternal conflicts between segments of the
military elite have been multiplied.
The diversification and specialization of
military technology have lengthened the
time of formal training required to acquire
mastery of military technology, with the re-
sult that the temporary citizen army will
become less important and a completely
professional army more vital.
The complexity of the machinery of war-
fare and the requirements for research, de-
velopment, and technical maintenance tend
to weaken the organization line between the
military and the non-military.
Because of these technological and large-
scale administrative developments, civilian
society as well as the military establishment
is undergoing basic transformation. The con-
temporary tension in political-military or-
ganization within the major industrialized
powers has a common basis to the degree
that the technological requirements of war
are highly universal. Yet the differences in
the amount or character of political power
exercised by military leaders and the meth-
ods for resolving conflicts between political
and military leaders as between the major
nation-states cannot be explained primarily
or, even to any great extent, by differences
in the technological organization of their
armed forces. This is not to deny that each
weapon system-land, sea, or naval-tends
to develop among its military managers
characteristic orientations toward politics
based on the technical potentialities of their
weapons. The political outlook of any mili-
tary establishment will be influenced by
whether it is an organization dominated by
army, navy, or air force. Nevertheless, tech-
nological developments merely set the lim-
its within which the civilian and military
elites will share power. National differences
in the influence patterns of military elites
must be linked to national differences in
social structure and elite organization.
These technological trends in war-making
have necessitated extensive common modi-
fication in the military profession in both
democratic and totalitarian systems and re-
gardless of national and cultural differences.
The changes in the military reflect organiza-
tional requirements which force the perma-
nent military establishment to parallel other
civilian large-scale organizations. As a re-
sult, the military takes on more and more
the common characteristics of a government
or business organization. Thereby, the dif-
ferentiation between the military and the
civilian-an assumed prerequisite for the
democratic elite model-is seriously weak-
ened. In all these trends the model of the
professional soldier is being changed by
&dquo;civilianizing&dquo; the military elite to a greater
extent than the &dquo;militarizing&dquo; of the civilian
elite.
What are some of these modifications in
the military profession? They include (a)
&dquo;democratization&dquo; of the officer recruitment
base, ( b ) a shift in the basis of organization
authority, and (c) a narrowing of the skill
differential between military and civilian
elites. Propositions concerning these trends
for the United States military during the
last fifty years are applicable in varying
form to the military establishment of the
other major industrialized nations (5).
a) &dquo;DEMOCRATIZATION&dquo; OF THE
OFFICER RECRUITMENT BASE
Since the turn of the century the top
military elites of the major industrialized
nations have been undergoing a basic social
transformation. The military elites have been
shifting their recruitment from a narrow,
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relatively high-status social base to a broad-
er, lower-status, and more representative
social base.
The broadening of the recruitment base
reflects the demand for large numbers of
trained specialists. As skill becomes the
basis of recruitment and advancement,
&dquo;democratization&dquo; of selection and mobility
increases. This is a specific case of the gen-
eral trend in modern social structure of the
shift from criteria of ascription to those of
achievement. In western Europe the &dquo;de-
mocratization&dquo; of the military elites dis-
placed the aristocratic monopoly of the offi-
cer corps; in the United States an equiva-
lent process can be observed, although so-
cial lines are generally less stratified and
more fluid. The sheer increase in size of the
military establishment contributes to this
&dquo;democratization.&dquo; The United States Air
Force, with its large demand for technical
skill, offered the greatest opportunity for
rapid advancement.
From the point of view of the democratic
model, &dquo;democratization&dquo; of social recruit-
ment of military leaders is not necessarily
accompanied by &dquo;democratization&dquo; of out-
look and behavior. By &dquo;democratization of
outlook and behavior&dquo; is meant an increase
in accountability or an increase in the will-
ingness to be accountable. In fact, the de-
mocratization of the military profession car-
ries with it certain opposite tendencies. The
newer strata are less aware of the traditions
of the democratic model. Their opportuni-
ties for mobility make them impatient and
demanding of even greater mobility. Their
loyalty to the military establishment begins
to depend more and more on the conditions
of employment rather than on the commit-
ment to the organization and its traditions.
The increased representativeness of social
background of the military profession also
results in an increased heterogeneity of the
top leaders within the various military serv-
ices. Under these conditions it is more diffi-
cult to maintain organization effectiveness
and at the same time enforce the norms of
civilian political control. (In a totalitarian
society, it likewise becomes more difficulty to
maintain organization effectiveness and en-
force party loyalty.) Of course, any large-
scale organization develops devices for over-
coming these forms of disruption. The mili-
tary profession emphasized honor as a uni-
fying ideology, and intra-service marriage
patterns have been a power device for assim-
ilating newcomers into the military estab-
lishment. But requirements of bureaucratic
efficiency corrode honor, and the military
marriage, like civilian marriage, is currently
more limited in its ability to transmit tradi-
tions.
Even more fundamental, the new &dquo;de-
mocratization&dquo; changes the prestige position
of the military profession. The older tradi-
tional soldier has his social prestige regu-
lated by his family of origin and by the
civilian stratum from which he came. What
society thought was of little importance as
long as his immediate circle recognized his
calling. This was true even in the democrat-
ic model. The British officer corps, with its
aristocratic and landed-gentry background
and its respectable middle-class service fam-
ilies, is the classic case in point. In varying
degrees before World War II it was true for
the United States Navy, with its socialite
affiliation, and even the United States Ar-
my, with its southern military family tradi-
tions. But with democratization of the pro-
fession, the pressure develops for prestige
recognitions by the public at large. A public
relations approach must supplant a set of
personal relations. Public relations becomes
not merely a task for those specialists as-
signed to developing public support for mil-
itary establishment policies. Every profes-
sional soldier, like every businessman or
government officials, must represent his es-
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tablishment and work to enhance the pres-
tige of the professional military. In turn, a
military figure becomes a device of enhanc-
ing a civilian enterprise. Under these cir-
cumstances, objective control gives way to
subjective identity.
b) SHIFT IN THE BASIS OF
ORGANIZATION AUTHORITY
It is common to point out that military
organization is rigidly stratified and authori-
tarian in character because of the necessities
of command. Moreover, since military rou-
tines are highly standardized, it is generally
asserted that promotion is in good measure
linked to compliance with existing proce-
dures and existing goals of the organization.
(These characteristics are found in &dquo;civil-
ian&dquo; bureaucracies but supposedly not with
the same high concentration and rigidity.)
Once an individual has entered into the mil-
itary establishment, he has embarked on a
career within a single pervasive institution.
Short of withdrawal, he thereby loses the
&dquo;freedom of action&dquo; that is associated with
occupational change in civilian life.
From such a point of view, the profes-
sional soldier is thought to be authoritarian
in outlook. Status and the achievement of
status are thought to be fundamental motiva-
tions. The organizing principle of authority
is domination-the issuing of direct com-
mands. The professional soldier is seen as
limited in his ability and skill to participate
in &dquo;civilian&dquo; political affairs which require
flexibility, negotiation, and the &dquo;art of per-
suasion.&dquo;
However, it is not generally recognized
that a great deal of the military establish-
ment resembles a civilian bureaucracy as it
deals with problems of research, develop-
ment, supply, and logistics. Even in those
areas of the military establishment which
are dedicated primarily to combat or to the
maintenance of combat readiness, a central
concem of top commanders is not the en-
forcement of rigid discipline but rather the
maintenance of high levels of initiative and
morale. This is a crucial respect in which
the military establishment has undergone a
slow and continuing change since the origin
of mass armies and rigid military discipline
(8).
Initiative rather than the enforcement of
discipline is a consequence of the technical
character of modem warfare, which requires
highly skilled and highly motivated groups
of individuals. Often these formations must
operate as scattered and detached units, as
opposed to the solid line of older formations.
It is also a consequence of the recruitment
policies of modern armies, which depend on
representative cross-sections of the civilian
population rather than on volunteers. Mod-
ern armies increasingly draw their recruits
from urbanized and industrialized popula-
tions and less from illiterate agricultural
groups, for whom response to discipline is a
crucial and effective form of control. Toler-
ance for the discomforts of military life de-
creases. The &dquo;rationality&dquo; and skeptism of
urban life carry over into military institu-
tions to a greater degree than in previous
generations. The rationalization of military
life makes necessary the supplying of more
explicit motives. Social relations, personal
leadership, material benefits, ideological in-
doctrination, and the justice and meaning-
fulness of war aims are now all component
parts of morale.
Short of complete automation, specialized
units manning the crucial technical instru-
ments of war must display fanatically high
morale in order to achieve successful mili-
tary offensive action. Although military for-
mations are still organized on the basis of
dicipline, military command involves an ex-
tensive shift from domination to manipula-
tion as a basis of authority. Manipulation
implies persuasion, negotiation, and expla-
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nation of the ends of the organization. Di-
rect orders give way to the command con-
ference. Since manipulation involves high
social interaction, differences in status are
tempered by morale objectives. Shifts from
domination to manipulation, from status to
morale, are present in many aspects of civil-
ian society. However, the peculiar conditions
of combat have obscured the extent to which
morale leadership is especially required for
military formations. This is not to imply that
the military establishment has found a for-
mula for approximately balancing domina-
tion and manipulation.
c) NARROWING THE SKILL DIFFERENTIAL
BETWEEN MILITARY AND CIVILIAN ELITES
The consequences of the new tasks of
military management imply that the profes-
sional soldier is required more and more to
acquire skills and orientations common to
civilian administrators and even political
leaders. He is more interested in the inter-
personal techniques of organization, morale,
negotiation, and symbolic interaction. He is
forced to develop political orientations in
order to explain the goals of military activi-
ties to his staff and subordinates. Not only
must the professional soldier develop new
skills necessary for internal management; he
must develop a &dquo;public relations&dquo; aptitude,
in order to relate his formation to other mil-
itary formations and to civilian organiza-
tions. This is not to imply that these skills
are ,found among all the top military profes-
sionals, but the concentration is indeed great
and seems to be growing. The transferability
of skills from the military establishment to
civilian organizations is thereby increased.
Within the military establishment, conflicts
occur and deepen with greater acceleration
between the old, traditionally oriented off-
cers and the new, who are more sensitized
to the emerging problems of morale and
initiative.
Trends in 1 ndoctrination
In the past, institutional indoctrination of
the military professional in the United States
avoided discussion of human factors in the
military establishment and the political con-
sequences of military operations. (It is, of
course, difficult, if not impossible, to intel-
lectualize at any length about the enforce-
ment of discipline.) Before World War II,
the United States professional military had
a schooling which supplied little realistic
orientation except to emphasize a simple
mechanical version of ultimate civilian su-
premacy. However, even before the out-
break of World War II, slowly and pain-
fully important sectors of the military elite
had to reorient themselves on these matters.
Reorientation came about as a result of the
realities of the war. Of course, much of the
crucial work merely devolved upon lower-
rank staff officers and technical specialists,
with the &dquo;top military cadre&dquo; not fully in
sympathy.
In the absence of institutional indoctrina-
tion for these tasks, impressive indeed is the
extent to which self-indoctrination succeeded
in producing the number of officers capable
of functioning in these areas. Nevertheless,
the military establishment continues to be
characterized by deep inner tensions because
of its new responsibilities and because of
the absence of a sufficiently large cadre of
top officers sensitized to deal effectively with
its broad administrative and political tasks.
Before World War II, whatever training
and indoctrination existed for handling the
complexities of civil-military relations and
political tasks was primarily a self-generated
mission. Some deviant career officers were
not only sensitive to the emerging problems
within the military establishment, but many
of these officers sought to indoctrinate them-
selves about emerging problems of civil-
military relations and of the political aspects
of military operations. They often accepted
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specialized assignments of a quasi-political
nature or those involving communications
skills which supplied relevant opportunities
for indoctrination and training. (These as-
signments included military attach6, foreign-
language ofhcer, intelligence officer, and
public relations.) Voluntary acceptance or
pursuit of these assignments represented
genuine efforts at self-indoctrination and
thereby selected out for training those who
felt inclined and had potentials for growth.
In the United States especially, before 1939,
these assignments had relatively low pres-
tige. In fact, they were seen as interfering
with one’s career, and therefore they were
avoided by all except those who had suffi-
cient foresight to see their high relevance.
For many, these assignments did involve
risk and short-term disadvantages. However,
the results of such assignments in crucial
cases were just the contrary. They assisted
officers in entering the very top of the mili-
tary elite, since they did, in fact, represent
realistic indoctrination for emerging tasks.
Since the end of World War II, at all
levels of the military establishment institu-
tional indoctrination encompasses much
wider perspectives-social and political. Al-
though much of the new indoctrination ap-
pears to be oriented to the broader prob-
lems of the military establishment-internal
and extenlal-it is very much an open ques-
tion as to what the consequences are likely
to be for civil-military relations in a demo-
cratic society.
Ideological indoctrination is now designed
to eliminate the civilian contempt for the
&dquo;military mind.&dquo; The &dquo;military mind&dquo; has
been charged with a lack of inventiveness
and traditionalism. The new indoctrination
stresses initiative and continuous innova-
tion. This is appropriate for the career mo-
tives of the new recruits and is important
in creating conditions for overcoming bu-
reaucratic inertia. The &dquo;military mind&dquo; has
been charged with an inclination toward
ultra-nationalism and ethnocentrism. Profes-
sional soldiers are being taught to de-em-
phasize ethnocentric thinking, since ethno-
centrism is detrimental to national and mil-
itary policy. The &dquo;military mind&dquo; has been
charged as being disciplinarian. The new
indoctrination seeks to deal with human
factors in combat and in large-scale organi-
zation in a manner similar to contempo-
rary thought on human relations in industry.
In short, the new indoctrination is designed
to supply the professional soldier with an
opinion on all political, social, and economic
subjects which he feels obliged to have as
a result of his new role.
The new &dquo;intellectualism&dquo; is a critical ca-
pacity and a critical orientation. The mili-
tary officer must be realistic, and he must
review the shortcomings of the past and
contemporary record of political-military re-
lations. Will the growth of critical capacities
be destructive, or will it be productive of
new solutions? The consequence could be a
growth in hostility toward past arrange-
ments, in particular toward past political
leadership of the military establishment and
toward the dogmas of civilian supremacy.
The military profession runs the risk of con-
fusing its technical competency with intel-
lectual background. As a result, it could
become critical and negative toward the
military bureaucracy and toward civilian po-
litical leadership in the same way that Jo-
seph Schumpeter speaks of the university-
trained specialist becoming_ critical of the
economic system. In the United States at
least, such hostility is hardly likely to lead to
open disaffectation but more to passive re-
sentment and bitterness.
In the long run, under either the demo-
cratic or the totalitarian model, the military
establishment cannot be controlled and still
remain effective by civilianizing it. Despite
the growth of the logistical dimensions of
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warfare, the professional soldier is, in the
last analysis, a military commander and not
a business or organizational administrator.
The democratic elite model of civilian su-
premacy must proceed on the assumption
that the functions of the professional mili-
tary are to command soldiers into battle.
There is no reason to believe that the char-
acteristics of the ideal professional soldier
as a military commander are compatible
with the ideal professional soldier as an ob-
ject of civilian control, although the differ-
ences seem to be growing less and less as
the automation of war continues. The qual-
ity of political control of the professional
soldier is not to be judged by examining
those aspects of the military establishment
which are most civilian but rather those
which are least civilian. Here the willingness
to submit to civilian control, rather than the
actuality of civilian control, is most crucial.
There is no reason to believe, in a demo-
cratic society, that the military can be con-
trolled by offering them the conditions of
employment found in civilian society. In the
long run, civilian establishments would draw
o$ all the best talent, especially in a busi-
ness-dominated society. To achieve the ob-
jectives of the democratic elite model, it is
necessary to maintain and build on the dif-
ferentiation between civilian and military
roles. A democratic society must accord the
professional soldier a position based on his
skill and on his special code of honor. He
must be integrated because his fundamental
differentiation is recognized. Under these
circumstances, standards of behavior can be
established and political directives enforced.
The current drift toward the destruction of
the differentiation of the military from the
civilian cannot produce genuine similarity
but runs the risk of creating new forms of
hostility and unanticipated militarism.
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